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 I.  Introduction 
 
A large body of research and numerous Federal anti-trust court rulings have been 
concerned with monopoly sports leagues.  Currently in North America, each of the four 
major team sports—baseball, basketball, football, and hockey—enjoys a monopoly 
position in that there is only one major league, or in the case of baseball, one entity 
comprised of the two major leagues.  Monopoly sports leagues are said to impose major 
welfare costs on fans and the public in general through restrictions on supply and through 
subsidies for stadium construction and renovation (Ross 1989; Siegfried and Zimbalist 
2000; Fort 2003; Leeds and von Allmen 2002; Noll 2003).  These are the usual kinds of 
welfare losses associated with monopoly which antitrust policy can ameliorate.   
While monopoly prices and high subsidies for stadiums may harm consumers and 
taxpayers compared to competitive alternatives, researchers and Federal courts have also 
recognized that sports leagues are unique among industries in that competition between 
businesses (teams) in the industry (league) is the product being sold.  In sports, for 
example, industrywide rules on the allocation of players can enhance consumer welfare 
by improving the quality of entertainment.  If one team is allowed to become much worse 
that the others, the industry’s product is made worse, and even fans of other teams may 
prefer a more balanced league.  In contrast, in an industry such as automobiles, the 
production of poor quality vehicles by one firm doesn’t necessarily reduce the utility 
consumers receive from driving cars produced by a firm making high quality cars. 
This difference between sports leagues and other industries has been noted by 
Federal courts, which have granted the leagues considerable leeway in setting up rules 
that other industries would not be allowed to enact.  For example, sports leagues are 
allowed to decide how many teams there will be, as well as rules about how to conduct 
games and when in the season trades can be made between teams.  In this paper, I am 
concerned with the welfare implications of one possible rationale for limiting the number 
lawrence_kahn_monopoly_expansion_paper_cesifo_november_2003.doc 11/17/03 10:06 AM  of teams--the quality of play.  Since athletic talent is scarce, at any time, the quality of 
games depends on how diluted the talent level is.  A decision to expand a sports league 
by allowing a franchise in a new city will raise sports fans’ utility in that city, since 
before the expansion, they had no live access to the sport.  On the other hand, the fans in 
the existing cities may become worse off, since the entertainment they now see has been 
watered down.  This tension forms the basis of my analysis.   
To analyze the impact of sports league expansion on these two groups of fans—
the ones in the expansion locations vs. the fans in the existing locations--I build a simple 
model of the demand for team sports entertainment.  I then contrast the league size under 
competition and under monopoly.  Under competition, the league is powerless to prevent 
new entry, and policies to break up sports leagues are a move in the competitive 
direction.  Under monopoly, the league is allowed to decide its own size, and there is no 
anti-trust policy breaking it up into competing entities.  The model shows, not 
surprisingly, that the league is smaller under monopoly than under competition.  I then 
note that when the league expands and, assuming that athletic talent is scarce, takes in 
less talented players, utility of the existing fans is lowered, since the average quality of 
play has fallen.  This result implies that the optimal size of the league is likely to be 
smaller than what we would find under competition.   
In my simple but general model, I contrast two situations:  i) all revenues come 
from national television and are shared equally; ii) all revenues are local and not shared.  
The National Football League (NFL), which among the major team sports has the largest 
revenue share coming from national television (55.3% as 1996), best fits the former 
model, while the National Hockey League (NHL), which has the smallest national 
television revenue share (14.9% in 1996), most closely fits the latter.
1  Moreover, there is 
a 60-40 gate split in the NFL but no gate sharing in the NHL, furthering bolstering my 
                                                 
1  Revenue figures are taken from Leeds and von Allmen (2002), p. 74. 
  2picture of the NFL’s revenue as national and shared and the NHL’s revenue as local and 
not shared (Fort 2003, pp. 158 and 160).  Under either pricing model, the optimal league 
size is smaller than the competitive league size, due to the loss of consumers’ surplus as 
the sport expands.  In the national television model, in which it is assumed that the 
monopoly league cannot capture the inframarginal fans’ consumer surplus, the optimal 
size is larger than the monopoly league size.  Further, under some conditions in this 
model, the monopoly outcome is closer to the optimum than the competitive outcome is, 
and under other conditions, the competitive outcome is closer to the optimum.  In 
general, the more rapidly the average talent level falls as the league expands, the more 
likely the monopoly solution is to be closer to the optimum.  In the local revenue model, 
the optimal league size is the same as the monopoly league size.  This is the case since 
the league’s maximization of total profit takes into account the willingness to pay by fans 
of inframarginal teams in making its expansion decisions.  This calculation can’t be made 
when revenues and pricing decisions are determined nationally and must be uniform. 
These results imply that in some cases, using antitrust policy to break up a sports 
league actually hurts consumers, while in others such policies help.  Moreover, suppose 
the talent level becomes more elastic in the national television model (i.e., the talent level 
falls off less quickly as the number of players expands).  This could have happened when, 
for example, baseball, hockey and basketball recruited more and more foreign players.  
Then the optimal league size in this case moves toward the competitive outcome, and 
antitrust enforcement has a larger chance of enhancing consumer welfare.  However, 
under the local revenue model, allowing more foreign players has no influence on the 
conclusion that the monopoly outcome is the optimal one, although the optimal and 
monopoly league size will increase.  Further, technological changes that increase the 
fraction of nationally-shared revenues in a sport decrease the likelihood that the 
monopoly outcome is near the optimal outcome and thus enhance the rationale for 
antitrust intervention.   
  3Finally, allowing teams to relocate at will does not alter my basic conclusion that 
the competitive league size is too large.  Moreover, a regulation allowing free team 
mobility but league-controlled size produces the highest overall welfare.  This is the case 
since the league can account for inframarginal fans’ utility but free mobility allows an 
efficient allocation of the teams across locations. 
 
II.  The Basic Models 
In this section, I set up the basic model and derive implications about the relative 
size of a sports league under competition and monopoly as well as the optimal league 
size.  I contrast two types of revenue arrangement.  First, I assume that all revenues 
originate from national television contracts and are shared equally (the “national 
television model”).  Second, I assume that all revenues are local and are not shared across 
teams (the “local revenue model”). 
 
A.  The National Television Model 
 
In this model, assume that all revenues originate from national television contracts 
and are split equally across the teams.  Suppose that the league consists of T teams, one 
per location, which have equal populations and identical consumers within each location, 
although across locations, consumer incomes and tastes can differ.
2  Suppose the teams 
are arranged in decreasing order of their markets’ willingness to pay to see games, 
through cable television subscriptions, for instance.  This willingness to pay can be a 
function of income, tastes, or the local availability of substitutes.  And assume, for 
                                                 
2  The assumption about equal city size is made for analytical convenience in order to allow me to focus on 
price rather than quantity within cities.  Below, I discuss the possibility of multiple teams locating in the 
same city.  Specifically, in section III I show that the same results about the non-optimality of the free entry 
equilibrium hold even when teams are free to locate in any city they want.  And possible heterogeneity of 
fan preferences within cities is discussed in section III as well. 
  4simplicity, that there is a continuum of teams, although the basic logic of the models 
holds even with a discrete number of teams.  Assume also that average player quality in 
the league positively affects each locality’s demand price and that player quality declines 
as league size increases. 
In accordance with these assumptions, let the following function summarize the 
fans’ willingness to pay to see games for team t in a league with T teams, where t<T: 
 




where P is the aggregate willingness of team t’s fans to pay to have a local franchise, A is 
a scaling factor, -a reflects the elasticity of the willingness to pay with respect to an 
increase in the team index, where 0<a<1, and -q is the elasticity of the fan value placed 
on average player quality with respect to league size.  The assumption that 0<a<1 implies 
that demand elasticity for the league as a whole is greater than one in absolute value, a 
condition we expect to hold in a monopoly equilibrium.   
Equation (1) abstracts from issues of competitive balance.  I assume that 
embedded in equation (1) is an optimal allocation of player talent across teams, decided 
upon either by the league through policies such as a team salary cap or through 
unrestricted Coasian player movement.  This implies that the ranking of franchises with 
respect to demand prices incorporates both the local fans’ demand for teams of a given 
quality and the impact on demand price of the specific allocation of talent.  Teams in the 
locations with lower values of t—that is, teams with a higher local demand for teams—
are likely to be better than teams with a higher value of t, and fan desires to see winning 
teams as well as high quality competition are likely to both be reflected in the demand 
function.  This reasoning implies that as the league expands into presumably less 
lucrative locations, the expected winning percentage of team t increases (Noll 2003), and 
it is therefore theoretically possible that the fans in location t actually increase their 
  5demand price when T rises, contrary to the assumption in equation (1).  On the other 
hand, with rising league size, the probability that team t wins the championship or 
advances deep into the playoffs falls, and this impact could in principle outweigh the 
positive impact of a higher T on team t’s in-season winning percentage.  Moreover, as 
discussed by Noll (2003), it is plausible that the team with the least favorable market also 
has the smallest fan responsiveness to own team quality, implying that competitive 
balance will fall when new teams are added.  This latter effect also serves to lower the 
demand price for team t when T rises.   
Noll’s (2003) analysis suggests that rising T has opposing effects on the 
entertainment value of the competition in city t, although the effect on the absolute 
quality of play is unambiguously negative.  Therefore, to highlight the impact of talent 
dilution, I assume that the negative effect of T on P(t) through i) the reduction in overall 
talent, ii) reduction in the probability of winning the championship and iii) reduction of 
competitive balance outweighs any possible positive impact of T on P(t) through the 
increase in location t’s winning percentage.  In other words, a maintained hypothesis of 
this model is that the net effect of expansion on inframarginal fans’ demand price is 
negative.  As long as this assumption holds, then the results discussed below will hold.   
In equation (1), the assumption about equal-sized fan bases across teams allows 
me to interpret (1) as a price equation for the representative fan, by normalizing the 
number of potential fans in an area to 1.  Below, I discuss the possibility of within-city 
heterogeneity of fan preferences and therefore downward sloping fan demand within a 
city to have a franchise.  Equation (1) implies that the local fans’ willingness to pay to see 
the marginal team in a T team league is: 
 





  6  Assume that the costs of a T team league, including both nonplayer costs and the 
opportunity costs of the players’ time are: 
 
(3) C(T) = T
c,  
 
where c>=1, and any scaling factor in league costs is subsumed without loss of generality 
in A.  To abstract from issues of bargaining between players and owners, we can 
visualize either a sport where teams are directly owned by players or where the teams and 
the players arrive at an efficient bargain over the surplus the enterprises earn over their 
nonplayer costs and the opportunity costs of the players’ time.  Note that as the league 
expands, it may bring in players with a lower opportunity of cost of their time, since they 
are less skilled than the incumbent players.  It is therefore theoretically possible that 
marginal opportunity costs could fall, implying that c could be less than one.  In such a 
case, all of the results of my models would still hold as long as marginal costs don’t fall 
faster with league size than the fans’ willingness to pay.  On the other hand, marginal 
costs could rise if new teams are located in costlier sites.  The assumption that c>=1 is a 
sufficient condition for my basic results but is not necessary. 
In this model, the league must contract with a national television network to show 
the games.  I make two alternative pricing assumptions in this framework.  First, suppose 
that the network must sell subscriptions to the games at a uniform national price and that 
the league will not accept any of its local fans being priced out of the market.  This 
implies that the national price of games to fans will be P(T), and that competition among 
the networks will lead the net revenue per team to be P(T) as well (broadcast production 
costs are assumed away here).  I also note that, given the assumption that 0<a<1, even if 
the network chose an unconstrained, profit-maximizing uniform price, this would still be 
  7P(T).
3  Second, assume that the networks can charge different prices to different markets 
and that competition again erodes the networks’ profits.  This implies that the league will 
earn the total net revenue from these local contracts, and below, I also analyze the 
implications of this pricing model. 
  Taking the uniform national pricing model first, I now contrast league size (T) 
under free entry, monopoly (i.e. where the league chooses T to maximize total league 
profits), and the league size that would maximize the difference between the fans’ 
willingness to pay and the total (opportunity) cost of the league—i.e. the optimal league 
size. 
Competition 






Solving for the log of competitive league size, we have: 
 
(5) lnTcomp = (c-1+a+q)
-1 [ln(1/c) + lnA], where Tcomp is the competitive league size and 
(c-1+a+q)>0.   
 
Monopoly 
  Under monopoly, the league chooses the size T that maximizes the surplus over 
costs.  Although this decision may involve adding new teams who will share in the 
surplus, with an appropriate entry fee, the existing teams can always be made better off 
                                                 
3  To see this, consider a network choosing a profit-maximizing, single price to charge national subscribers.  
If this price is At
-aT
-q, then t consumers will pay for the broadcasts (recall that the size of each market is 1, 
and with identical consumers within markets, either they all buy the broadcasts or they all do not).  
Assuming zero marginal cost of broadcasting (a reasonable assumption for television viewers), the network 




-q.  Since 1-a>0, revenue and therefore profits will be 
maximized at t=T. 
  8by expanding to the league size that maximizes total surplus.  And sports leagues 
regularly charge expansion fees to new entrants, making such an assumption realistic.
4  
Given the pricing assumption in equation (2), the league maximizes total surplus: 
 
(6)  П = P(T)T – C(T) = AT
1-a-q – T
c, where П is league profit (i.e. the surplus over 
opportunity costs). 
 
  The first order condition for maximizing profit leads to a log of monopoly league 
size of: 
 
(7) lnTmon = (c-1+a+q)
-1 [ln(1/c) + ln(1-a-q) + lnA], where Tmon is monopoly league size, 
and (1-a-q)>0 for an interior optimum.
5 
Comparing (6) and (7), we have: 
 
(8) ln Tcomp – ln Tmon = (1-c-a-q)
-1 [ln(1-a-q)]>0.  
 
Competitive league size, not surprisingly, is larger than monopoly league size. 
Optimal League Size 
  To compute the optimal league size, we need to take into the consumers’ surplus 
of all fans.  For any league size T, the surplus of fan utility over cost is: 
 
(9)  (   ∫ −
− − T q a c T dt T At 0 )
 
                                                 
4  For example, the new Houston Texans NFL team in 2000 paid a $700 million expansion fee to the league 
(Fort 2003, p. 142). 
5  The assumption of c>=1 is sufficient for the second order condition to hold, although it will still hold for 
some values of c<1 (i.e. declining marginal costs). 
  9In expression (9), we integrate across locations, where the willingness to pay is 
influenced by a location's inherent demand for the sport (indexed by t
-a) and the quality of 
the league.  Maximizing (9) with respect to league size T, we obtain the following first 
order condition for optimal league size: 
 
(10) (   ∫ = + −
− + − − − − T c q a a q cT AT dt At qT 0
1 ) ( 1 )
 
  Solving for the log of the optimal league size, we have: 
 
(11) lnTopt = (c-1+a+q)
-1 [ln(1/c) + ln(1-a-q)-ln(1-a)+lnA],  
 
where Topt is the optimal league size.  Comparing the three solutions for league size in 
equations (6), (7), and (11), we see that the optimal league size is between the 
competitive and the monopoly league sizes: 
 
(12) lnTcomp – lnTopt = (c-1+a+q)
-1 [ln(1-a)-ln(1-a-q)] >0 and 
(13) lnTopt – lnTmon =(c-1+a+q)
-1 [-ln(1-a)] >0. 
 
  A necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal league size to be closer (in 
relative terms, since we are comparing logs) to the monopoly than to the competitive 
league size is: 
(14) [ln(1-a)-ln(1-a-q)] > [-ln(1-a)], or equivalently, 
(15) q > a(1-a). 
  According to expression (15), if the rate at which talent falls with league 
expansion (q) is large as we go down the ranking of locations, then monopoly brings us 
closer to the optimal league size.  Breaking up a monopoly under such circumstances 
would actually hurt economic efficiency.  We can also interpret a large q as indicating 
  10that talent is very scarce, since the average quality of play would fall rapidly with 
expansion under a large q.  If a new source of talent opens up, lowering q, then according 
to (15), the likelihood that the optimum is closer to the competitive outcome increases.
6 
  The results so far are based on the uniform national pricing assumption 
exemplified by equation (2).  An alternative, plausible pricing assumption is to allow the 
network that buys the rights to sell different packages to fans in different cities.  Again, if 
there is competition among potential networks, then the league can charge a price equal 
to the networks’ net revenue from these separate deals.  Specifically, if the league has T 
teams, then the total revenue a network can collect from fan subscriptions, which will 
also be the equilibrium fee collected by the sports league, is: 
 
(16) ( = A(1-a)
-1T
1-a-q, which implies that under a league rule requiring equal 
sharing of revenues, each team will receive the following revenue: 
∫
− − T q a dt T At 0 )
 




  I now contrast the competitive, monopoly and optimal league sizes under this 
pricing model.  First, under competition, T will expand until the revenue per team just 





c-1, implying that log league size under competition in this model 
(Tcomp*) has the following solution: 
                                                 
6  This example assumes that the league opportunity cost function remains unchanged even though the 
talent supply has become more elastic.  More realistically, if the identification of new sources of talent has 
a sufficiently larger effect on q than on c, then the conclusions stated above hold.  This assumption is 
highly likely for sports, since differences in sports productivity among athletes or potential athletes are 
probably much larger than differences in productivity in alternative occupations (and thus differences in the 
opportunity costs of their time) for these individuals.  In addition, as expressions (12)-(15) also show, 
raising a (i.e. raising the elasticity of demand price with respect to location) has ambiguous effects on the 
relative sizes of the optimal, competitive and monopoly leagues. 
  11(19) ln Tcomp* = (c-1+a+q)
-1 [ln(1/c) - ln(1-a)+lnA]. 
 
  Comparing equations (5) and (19) shows that competitive league size is larger 
under the pricing arrangement where local cable deals can be written because these 
increase potential profitability and attract more entrants than under the national one-price 
scheme.  The model with local cable deals therefore leads to a competitive outcome with 
a larger efficiency loss than the uniform pricing model, since competitive league size is 
larger when local cable deals can be made, and the earlier analysis showed that even the 
smaller competitive size under equation (5) was too large. 
  Monopoly league size can be determined by maximizing league surplus П*: 
 
(20) П* = A(1-a)
-1T
1-a-q - T
c.   
 
This is the same maximand as was the case for finding the optimal league size.  This 
conclusion holds since the revenue received in allowing local cable deals exhausts the 
fans’ willingness to pay.  By making a leaguewide decision, the teams can take account 
of the effect of diminishing talent levels on fans’ demand for games.  In contrast, with 
free entry, new entrants don’t take into account their effects on the inframarginal fans’ 
consumer surplus.  Therefore, under the local cable pricing policy, we have the following 
solution for both monopoly (Tmon*) and optimal (Topt) league size: 
 
(21) ln Tmon* = ln Topt = (c-1+a+q)
-1 [ln(1/c) + ln(1-a-q)-ln(1-a)+lnA]. 
 
Inspection of this result and equation (19) shows again that the monopoly and optimal 
league size is less than the competitive league size. 
 
B.  The Local Revenue Model 
  12 
  Analytically, a model where each team keeps 100% of its revenue and all 
revenues are local can be analyzed similarly to the two national television models 
discussed above.  Under the local revenue model, the monopoly and optimal outcomes 
are the same, and league size under competition is too large.  To see this, note that if all 
revenues are local and kept by the local team in question, the local fans’ willingness to 
pay at location t in a league of size T can be expressed by equation (1) above, which is 
reproduced here: 
 
(1’) P(t) = At
-aT
-q.   
  
  The marginal team’s revenue is therefore the same as under the first uniform 
national pricing model in which the network had to charge the same price to everyone: 
 





  As in the uniform pricing model above, under free entry, the league expands until 






implying that the competitive league size is: 
 
(5’) lnTcomp = (c-1+a+q)
-1 [ln(1/c) + lnA], 
 
the same as in the uniform pricing national television model because the marginal team 
faces the same entry decision calculation in either case. 
  13  When the league gets to choose its surplus-maximizing size, the result is 
analytically the same as the outcome under the national television model in which the 
network charges a different price to each locality.  Specifically, league surplus, as well as 
the aggregate surplus for society is: 
 
(20’) П* = A(1-a)
-1T
1-a-q - T
c.   
 
And the monopoly and optimal league sizes are the same and expressed as: 
 
(21’) ln Tmon* = ln Topt = (c-1+a+q)
-1 [ln(1/c) + ln(1-a-q)-ln(1-a)+lnA]. 
 
  This analysis thus shows that in a model where all revenues are local, letting the 
league decide on its size based on team-player surplus will lead to efficient league size, 
balancing out fan desires for high quality and high quantity of athletic competition. 
 
III.  Extensions and Implications 
 
In this section I discuss several extensions and caveats regarding the basic 
framework of section II.  These include the possibility of multiple teams locating in the 
same city, heterogeneity of local fan preferences, the impact of opponent quality on fan 
demand, changing sources of revenue in professional sports, and the applicability of this 
analysis to the NCAA. 
 
A.  Multiple Teams in the Same City 
 
This subsection shows that my basic result about competition leading to an 
excessively large league size holds even when teams are allowed to freely locate 
  14wherever they want.  To see this, let us modify the basic local fan demand price equation 
to reflect the number of teams in the city: 
 





where f(t) is the number of teams in location t and n >0.  Equation (22) assumes that 
demand price in city t is a positive function of the inherent demand for sports in the city 
(negatively indexed by t through the term t
-a) and a negative function of the number of 
teams f(t) in the city.  The models of section II assumed that f(t) could be at most 1, 
reflecting for example technological or political constraints on the number of teams a city 
can have.  For instance, a locality may only give permission or subsidies for a limited 
number of stadiums or arenas; once this limit is set, there may be scheduling constraints 
preventing the number of teams from increasing beyond a certain limit.  In this 
subsection, I relax this assumption and allow franchises to locate wherever they want.   
  I now compare competitive, monopoly and optimal outcomes under this model.  I 
first note that whatever the number of franchises T, the assumption of free relocation 
implies that the demand price facing each team must be the same.  If this were not true, 
then teams would relocate until it became true.  The demand price in the high price cities 
would fall as teams relocated there, according to equation (22).  This means that, given 




-n = K(T). 
 
The function K(-) falls as T rises:  K’<0.  To see this, consider the discrete version 
of the model and suppose that there are four potential locations:  t0 < t1 < t2 < t3.  Suppose 
further that the total number of teams is such that there is exactly one franchise in 
  15location 2 and therefore none in location 3 and more than one in each of locations 0 and 










  Now if we let the league size grow by a sufficiently small amount, the three 
existing locations indexed by t0, t1, and t2 will absorb the increase.  This means that with a 
higher T, ti
-af(ti)
-n has fallen for i=0, 1 and 2.  If T keeps increasing, then eventually,  
t2
-af(t2)
-n will equal t3
-a, and the location indexed by t3 will become viable.  The same 
reasoning holds under the continuous version of the model, implying that K’<0.  We 
therefore write the following function for K(-): 
 
(25)  K(T)=BT
-k for some k>0 and scaling factor B>0.   
 
In this model, for larger values of n relative to a, then expanding to a new location 
leads to a smaller falloff in consumer demand relative to adding franchises to existing 
locations.  Therefore, with a large n and a small a, league expansion will take place 
primarily through adding new locations. 
It is natural under this model to assume for any league size T, that the actual price 
charged to see games is the common demand price, which is the same everywhere (price 
will clearly be no higher than this, and there is no gain to teams or television networks to 
charging below the demand price).  Under competition, there is free entry into the league 





c-1, or  
(27) ln Tcomp** = (c-1+q+k)
-1 (lnA+lnB– ln c), where 
Tcomp** is competitive league size under these assumptions. 
  16 
  Now suppose the league is allowed to set its profit-maximizing size but cannot 
prevent teams from locating where they want.  Then the league chooses T to maximize 
total league surplus: 
 
(28) П = ABTmon**((Tmon**)
-(q+k))– (Tmon**)
c, where 
Tmon** is monopoly league size under this model. 
 




c-1, and solving for Tmon**, we have: 
(30) ln Tmon** = (c-1+q+k)
-1(ln A + lnB+ ln(1-q-k) – ln c). 
 
Since 0<(q+k)<1 (to guarantee an interior monopoly solution), monopoly league size is 
again smaller than competitive league size. 
  Now consider the optimal league size, which will take into account the negative 
effects of expansion on the inframarginal fans’ utility.  Given league size T, the total 






implying that the league size that maximizes net welfare is the monopoly league size, as 
was the case in the price discriminating cable operator and local revenue models 
discussed above.  This is the case for the same reasons as in section II:  the surplus-
maximizing monopolist is able to exhaust all of the consumers’ surplus. 
  It is interesting to compare league size and total welfare if we allow teams to 
locate anywhere they want vs. allowing only one franchise per location.  For any given 
  17league size T, we have the following expressions for net societal surplus under these two 
models: 
 
(32) Surplus| only one team per location =  - T
c  ∫
− − T q a dt T At 0 ) (
 
(33) Surplus| teams can locate where they want =  - T
c,   ∫
− − − L n q a dt t f T At 0 ) ) ( (
 
where L<=T is the number of locations where the T franchises play, and L is strictly less 
than T as long as fan demand within a city doesn’t decline too fast as the number of 
franchises in the city rises (i.e. n is small enough): 
 
(34) ( = T.  ∫
L dt t f 0 ) ) (
 
  Given league size T, comparing (32) and (33), it is easy to see that the total 
surplus is larger in (33), because in this model, we let teams relocate from low demand to 
high demand cities.  This means that the marginal city in the free mobility equilibrium 
has a larger willingness to pay to see exactly one franchise than in section II’s model of 
one team per city (L is strictly less than T).  Allowing teams to move out of the locations 
where t>L into locations where t<=L raises the total willingness to pay to see the sport.  
Therefore, the social (and monopoly) optimum in the free mobility equilibrium involves 
more teams than in the one team per city model.  Letting teams move provides greater 
gains for the fans in the high demand locations than the losses experienced by fans in the 
low demand locations.  But once we allow free location, for a social optimum, the league 
should be allowed to decide its overall size.   
 
B.  Heterogeneous Local Fan Preferences 
 
  18In two of the models presented in section II—the national television model in 
which the network can charge a different price for each location and the local revenue 
model—the optimal league size is the same as the monopoly league size.  This result 
depends in both cases on the seller’s (either the television network or the team itself) 
ability to extract all of the local fans’ consumer surplus.  This result occurs in these 
models because I have assumed that within each location, all fans have the same income 
and tastes.  Charging the marginal local fan his/her demand price allows the full 
consumers’ surplus to be captured, since each fan is the “marginal” fan.  In contrast, in a 
model with heterogeneous local fans, networks and teams may not be able to capture the 
consumers’ surplus, implying that the monopoly outcome may not be optimal.  However, 
the basic point about player quality and monopoly vs. competitive league size remains.  
Even with heterogeneous local fans, the marginal team only considers its own profit-loss 
calculation in deciding whether to enter.  As long as the fans care about player quality 
and as long as the player quality declines as the league expands (i.e., the demand price 
P(t) in area t declines as T rises), then the basic result that optimal league size is smaller 
than the free entry equilibrium league size remains. 
While it may be difficult to imagine local cable television contracts that can 
capture heterogeneous fans’ consumer surplus, the increasing use of “Personal Seat 
Licenses” by sports teams suggests that teams may in fact be able to at least partially do 
so.  Personal Seat Licenses are rights to buy a season ticket, and these rights are sold by 
local sports teams to fans.  They have become popular since 1993 when the NFL’s 
Carolina Panthers used them in connection with their new stadium (Leeds and von 
Allmen 2002, p. 119).  Analytically, Personal Seat Licenses can be seen as a component 
of a two part pricing scheme in which fans first buy the license and then buy their tickets.  
In principle, a team can charge the competitive price for tickets and then a Personal Seat 
License fee that exhausts all of the local consumers’ surplus (Leeds and von Allmen 
2002, p. 120).  Therefore the model of local team revenues in which the monopoly league 
  19size equaled the optimal league size still can hold even with heterogeneous local 
consumers, as long as teams can issue these Licenses.  Of course, this conclusion must be 
tempered by the fact that local television deals will likely not be able to exhaust 
heterogeneous local consumers’ surplus. 
 
C.  Competitive Balance, Opposition Quality and Local Fan Demand 
 
In 2002, Major League Baseball nearly eliminated two teams, the Montreal Expos 
and the Minnesota Twins, on financial grounds, and Noll (2003) presents an analysis of 
the economics of baseball contraction that bears some similarities to the approach I have 
taken here.  His analysis suggests that league contraction will some have positive and 
some negative effects on the net welfare produced by the remaining teams.  On the 
positive side is a rise in average team quality, the effect I have emphasized here, although 
he doesn’t incorporate this into his theoretical model.  Ross (2003) also speculates that 
unlimited expansion, while bringing a sport to new fans, could lead to reductions in the 
utility of existing fans, as “talent is diluted and the chance to see storied and talented 
teams decreases” (p. 326).  Presumably, the opposite effects would be realized under 
contraction.  On the other hand, Noll (2003) argues that under contraction, each 
remaining team’s winning percentage is likely to fall, since the weaker teams are likely to 
be slated for contraction (notwithstanding the success of the Minnesota Twins!).  This 
effect will lower fans’ willingness to pay.  Finally, Noll (2003) surmises, as mentioned 
earlier, that eliminating weak teams will improve competitive balance, on the assumption 
that these teams had the weakest incentive to be good teams.  And this effect will raise 
demand in the other locations.   
To try to determine whether the opponent quality effect on fan demand is large, 
Noll (2003) compares 2002 Major League Baseball road attendance figures for strong 
and weak teams.  He estimates that the difference in drawing power on the road between 
  20strong and weak teams is 100,000-200,000 fans per season (the average road attendance 
of the weakest and strongest teams was 2.1-2.45 million); however, home attendance for 
the better teams averaged 700,000 fans per season more than for the weakest teams 
(home attendance among these teams averaged 2.11-2.83 million).  This difference leads 
Noll (2003) to conclude that the fans’ demand to see high quality opposition is relatively 
weak, although it is still positive.  Moreover, the degree to which the absolute quality of 
one’s home team affects consumer demand, controlling for the team’s place in the 
standings, is not observable in this analysis. 
In contrast to this seemingly weak effect of opposition team quality on fan 
demand in baseball, Hausman and Leonard (1997) find an extremely large effect on NBA 
local television ratings of playing against a team with superstars such as Michael Jordan, 
Magic Johnson, or Larry Bird.  They in fact estimated that in the 1992 period, Michael 
Jordan generated roughly $53 million of revenue for other teams in the NBA in addition 
to his own team!  This bonanza came about through local attendance, television ratings, 
and shared revenues from merchandise sales.  Hausman and Leonard’s (1997) results 
imply that if the NBA had only 16 teams instead of its current 29, then fans in the 
remaining 16 locations would enjoy much greater exposure to other teams’ superstar 
players on average than they do now, and their utility could very likely be much higher.  
Suppose that at the margin, fans in the weakest markets have a smaller willingness to pay 
to see games than fans in the strongest markets (this of course assumes that the league or 
other cost barriers prevent teams from flooding the strong locations).  Taking the 
opportunity to see the league’s stars away from the weakest franchises by eliminating 
them and increasing the chances of fans in the strongest franchise areas to see stars would 
then raise overall consumer welfare, as long as the gain in the strong markets outweighs 
the loss in the weak markets. 
This contrast between the effect of opposition quality in baseball and basketball 
suggests that the relevance of the model I have presented here is an empirical question.  
  21In basketball, Hausman and Leonard’s (1997) findings suggest that monopoly may be 
especially welfare-enhancing in the NBA.  While Noll’s (2003) results for baseball 
suggest that the impact on demand of falling opposition quality with free entry is less 
important in baseball, it still has an effect on fan attendance.  And if rising baseball 
league size either reduces competitive balance, reduces individual franchises’ chances of 
winning the championship, has only small positive effects on individual franchises’ 
winning percentage, or raises fan demand everywhere by raising each team’s absolute 
quality, then the model also has relevance for baseball as well. 
 
D.  Revenue Sources:  Television vs. Gate 
 
As mentioned earlier, most hockey revenues are local, while the share of football 
revenues that is national is large and growing.  My analysis therefore suggests that 
monopoly is more likely to lead to the optimal outcome in hockey than in football, 
although as shown earlier, there are cases in which monopoly could lead to the optimal 
outcome in a sport with only national, equally-shared revenue sources.  Moreover, to the 
extent that a larger portion of revenues in each sport comes from nationally-shared 
television contracts, the national pricing model in which it is possible that the competitive 
outcome is closer to the optimum than the monopoly outcome is becomes more relevant.  
Whether national sources will become more important in the future is of course an 
empirical question.  While the global television market is likely to be growing, teams are 
becoming more sophisticated at using local venues such as luxury boxes to raise non-
shared revenues.   
 
E.  The NCAA and Economic Efficiency 
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presented here.  First, professional sports league rules and Federal court anti-trust rulings 
on the eligibility of players who have not finished (or in some cases not even started) 
college affect the supply of professional athletes and are therefore related to the models I 
have presented here.  For example, in 1971, a Federal Court struck down the NBA’s rule 
prohibiting college underclassmen from entering the league (Staudohar 1996, p. 117).  
And in September 2003, a player for Ohio State University, Maurice Clarett, sued the 
NFL on anti-trust grounds over its rule that prevents players from entering the league 
until they have been out of high school at least three years.
7  Allowing these younger 
players to enter the league is similar to allowing foreign players to enter the league and 
serves to reduce q, making the supply of talent more elastic.  As we have seen, in the 
uniform pricing version of the national television models, a falling q increases the 
likelihood that the competitive outcome will be closer to the optimum than the monopoly 
outcome will be.   
Second, the ideas in this paper can potentially be applied to the normal operations 
of the NCAA, which in the view of some acts as a traditional cartel to restrict output and 
payments to factors of production.  For example, the case just discussed in which a 
Federal court allowed underclassmen to enter the NBA draft has very likely reduced the 
supply of scarce stars to the NCAA.  Our model suggests that this will increase the 
likelihood that restricting the quantity of college sports entertainment raises consumer 
welfare.  For instance, in the 1950s, the NCAA reduced the number of football bowl 
games from over 50 to 9, presumably to increase revenues net of costs (Fleisher, Goff 
and Tollison 1992).  However, according to the logic of this paper, if the nine matchups 
involved better teams than the 50, then quality may have increased as the number of bowl 
games was cut, and consumer surplus may have been enhanced.  Moreover, when the 
                                                 
7  See, http://www.msnbc.com/news/969764.asp?0sl=-12, accessed October 20, 2003. 
  23NCAA instituted its current system of IA and I-AA, etc., designations, by limiting the 
number of schools in the top tier (I-A), quality again may have been enhanced.  It is 
possible though not necessarily certain that the gains to the fans of I-A teams outweighed 
the losses to fans of teams eliminated from consideration as I-A schools.  NCAA 
membership restrictions, according to the logic of this paper, have the greatest chance of 
enhancing efficiency the more localized the revenue sources are.  Moreover, the frequent 
conference realignments we observe in college sports are similar to team relocations 
within the context of a constant total league (i.e. NCAA division I-A) size.  Therefore, 
these realignments may be moving us closer to a nationwide optimum.  However, it 
should also be noted that the NCAA’s restrictions on player pay reduce the quantity and 
quality of athletic talent competing in college sports and may cause an inefficient 
reallocation of talent, if pay restrictions cause athletes to play elsewhere (e.g. in Europe), 
even though their marginal revenue products may be higher playing US college sports.  
 
IV.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper I have argued that unlike the usual welfare analysis of competition, 
in professional sports leagues, the optimal industry size may be less than what would be 
observed under free entry.  This is the case because athletic competition between business 
enterprises is the product.  As a sports league expands, the average quality of playing 
talent on the court or in the field falls.  Therefore, fans in inframarginal locations will 
view lower quality sports entertainment as a sports league expands, all else equal.  The 
welfare consequences of such expansions depend on the size of these losses relative to 
the gains the fans in new locations will realize.   
To analyze these issues, I built a simple model of sports leagues in which fan 
demand depends on the average quality of the league’s players and locality-specific 
factors such as income and tastes.  Under various pricing schemes, I compared league 
  24size under free entry and monopoly (in which the league decides on the profit-
maximizing league size), and the optimal league size that maximizes the total utility net 
of team opportunity costs.  Under a pricing scheme in which all revenues are national and 
split evenly and where a broadcast network charges a uniform national price to viewers, 
the optimal league size is between the larger competitive size and the smaller monopoly 
league size.  The more elastic the supply of talent, the closer the competitive size is to the 
optimum.  However, if the network can charge a different price to each location or if all 
revenues come from local sources such as gate receipts and local media, then the optimal 
league size is the same as the monopoly league size that maximizes total league profits, 
but the competitive league size is again too large.  In this case, maximizing league profits 
perfectly takes into account inframarginal fans’ lower willingness to pay for lower quality 
games, while the competitive outcome only depends on the marginal location’s fans’ 
willingness to pay and thus does not account for the inframarginal fans’ losses. 
An implication of these results is that anti-trust policy should not necessarily aim, 
at least on efficiency grounds, toward free entry into sports leagues.  For example, 1966 
Congressional legislation approving the merger between the NFL and the American 
Football League (Fort 2003, p. 384) may have raised economic efficiency; and the 
players’ acceptance of the National Basketball Association-American Basketball 
Association merger in 1976 (in return for collective bargaining concessions) and the 
NHL-World Hockey Association merger in 1979 (Staudohar 1996, p. 157) may have 
been efficient as well.  While this analysis implies that leagues should be allowed to 
determine their own size, I also found that the teams should be allowed to locate where 
they want.  Thus, the Oakland Raiders decision in which the NFL was not allowed to 
prevent the Raiders from moving to Los Angeles may have enhanced overall efficiency 
(Lehn and Sykuta 1997).  Of course, equity issues must also be considered as well.  And 
allowing teams to leave particular areas may result in large utility losses if there is an 
endowment effect or accumulated loyalty effects.  But if efficiency is to be a criterion of 
  25anti-trust policy, then this paper suggests that encouraging free entry into new areas may 
under some circumstances not be good policy.  In calculating the efficiency gains or 
losses entailed by league expansions, one must compute their effects on existing fans’ 
welfare as well as the value of the expansion franchises to the fans in the new locations. 
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